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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This appeal is concerned with the ripeness doctrine, a 
constitutional mandate derived from Article III’s requirement 
that federal courts hear only cases or controversies.  U.S. Const., 
Art. III, § 2.  The doctrine assists courts in avoiding the need to 
address speculative cases, in deferring to administrators with 
subject matter expertise, and in deciding cases on the basis of 
fully-developed records.  The Supreme Court has explained that 
the question of whether a controversy is “ripe” for judicial 
resolution has two aspects that require a court to evaluate both 
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the possible 
hardship to the parties if it withholds consideration of a case 
presented to it.  To some extent these inquiries require a court to 
exercise judgment, rather than to apply a black-letter rule.  
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 
1515 (1967). 
 In this case involving rules applying to the admission of 
certain foreign workers into the United States for temporary 
employment, we are mindful of the foregoing considerations and 
give due regard to the expertise exercised by the Department of 
Labor (“DOL”), the implicated agency principally involved in 
this case, and the historical shifts and political compromises 
underlying the DOL’s adoption of the rules at issue.  
Furthermore, in view of the subject matter of this litigation, we 
are concerned with the congressional policy to protect American 
workers from a depression of their wages attributable to the 
entry of foreign workers into the domestic labor market.   
 Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the District Court 
dismissing their challenge to 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f), a DOL 
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regulation applicable in the administration of the H-2B visa 
program that authorizes the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) to admit certain unskilled foreign workers into this 
country for temporary employment.  On this appeal, we are 
concerned with an aspect of the  H-2B program, the 2009 Wage 
Guidance, which authorizes employers to use privately-funded 
wage surveys to set the prevailing market wage for certain 
occupations.  The Court at the outset of its consideration of the 
case invoked the ripeness doctrine when it made a determination 
that the matter was not at that time justiciable and, accordingly, 
the Court would not consider the merits of plaintiffs’ challenge 
to the regulation.  Comité de Apoyo a Los Trabajadores 
Agricolas v. Perez, No. 14-2657, 2014 WL 4100708 (E.D. Pa. 
July 23, 2014) (CATA III).  We determine that this case is ripe 
for judicial review, render judgment for plaintiffs, and hold that 
20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance are arbitrary 
and capricious and in violation of the APA.  We order vacatur of 
20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance.1 
 
 II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL  
                HISTORY 
 Plaintiffs based their complaint challenging 20 C.F.R. § 
                                                 
1 The District Court dismissed without prejudice on justiciability 
grounds related litigation in Comité de Apoyo a Los 
Trabajadores Agricolas v. Perez, No. 13-7213, 2014 WL 
3629528, ____ F. Supp. 2d ____ (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2014), a case 
in which the plaintiffs sought judicial review of certain actions, 
decisions, and rules in the administration of the H-2B program. 
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655.10(f) and DOL’s 2009 Wage Guidance on the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  This case is another 
step in a long-running controversy concerning the administration 
of the H-2B program.  Resolution of discrete disputes arising 
from the controversy have led to this Court and district courts 
setting out the factual background and procedural history of the 
controversy in previous opinions.  See Comité de Apoyo a los 
Trabajadores Agrícolas v. Solis, No. 2:09-240 LP, 2010 WL 
3437761 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (CATA I); Comité de Apoyo 
a los Trabajadores Agrícolas v. Solis, 933 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. 
Pa. 2013) (CATA II); La. Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Solis, 889 F. 
Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Pa. 2012), aff’d sub nom. La. Forestry Ass’n 
Inc. v. Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 745 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 
2014).  Thus, though the issues we now address are new, we are 
not writing on a blank slate. 
 A.  The H-2B Visa Program  
 The H-2B visa program—named for the statutory section 
which authorized its creation2— allows United States employers 
to arrange for the admission of foreign workers (“H-2B 
workers”) into the United States to perform temporary unskilled 
non-agricultural work.  The governing criteria of the program 
were established through a process requiring the accommodation 
of political interests; the program balances employers’ 
temporary need for unskilled foreign workers against the need to 
protect United States workers’ employment, salaries, and 
working conditions.  In furtherance of these considerations, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes the 
                                                 
2 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 
101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(B), 66 Stat. 163, 168 (1952).  
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issuance of H-2B visas only in cases in which employers 
demonstrate that the employment of foreign workers admitted 
under the program will not adversely affect the wages and 
working conditions of United States workers.  8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 1182 (a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II).  
 DHS and DOL currently administer the H-2B program.  
The INA confers broad authority on DHS to admit aliens into 
this country and to promulgate regulations governing the 
issuance of nonimmigrant visas.  8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1).  The H-
2B program establishes a method for the issuance of visas 
differing from the ordinary practice by which a person seeking 
to be admitted into the United States applies for a visa because 
under the H-2B program the putative employer, not the person 
seeking to be admitted, makes the application.  Prior to filing an 
H-2B petition with DHS, an employer must obtain a temporary 
labor certification from the Secretary of Labor.  8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(6)(iii) (2011).  That certification constitutes DOL’s 
“advice” that DHS should grant the requested H-2B visa and 
must confirm that: (1) qualified workers are not available in the 
United States to perform the employment for which foreign 
workers are sought, and (2) the aliens’ employment will not 
adversely affect wages and working conditions of similarly 
employed United States workers.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A), 
(iv)(A).  DHS regulations provide for DOL to “establish 
procedures” for issuing labor certifications within these 
confines.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(D).  Inasmuch as the 
availability of workers is related to the wage offered for the 
employment because the higher the wage the greater the 
likelihood that domestic workers can be found for the 
employment, DOL issues labor certifications that certify that the 
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employment is not being filled by United States workers at the 
occupation’s “prevailing wage.”  Labor Certification Process 
and Enforcement for Temporary Employment in Occupations 
Other Than Agriculture or Registered Nursing in the United 
States (H-2B Workers), and Other Technical Changes, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 78,020-01, 78,056 (Dec. 19, 2008) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 
655.10(b)(2)).    
 B.  Calculation of Prevailing Wages  
 DOL through its H-2B procedures long has sought to 
avoid causing adverse effects on American workers’ wages and 
working conditions from the admission of foreign workers by 
requiring H-2B employers to offer and pay at least the 
prevailing wage both to the H-2B workers and to the United 
States workers engaged for the employment opportunity. To 
facilitate compliance with this requirement, DOL has from time 
to time published specific guidelines governing the system by 
which it will determine the prevailing wage for the employment 
that an employer is seeking to fill with foreign workers. 
 Over the years, DOL has changed its method for 
calculating prevailing wages on several occasions, often without 
giving interested parties notice of its intent to make the changes 
or the opportunity to comment on the contemplated changes, and 
has made the changes without explanation.  Initially, DOL 
advised state workforce agencies that became involved in the 
administration of the program to calculate a single prevailing 
wage for any given occupation in the area of intended 
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employment.3  In 1995, DOL altered its methodology to 
determine the level of prevailing wages by creating multiple 
prevailing wages for each H-2B occupation.  DOL initially 
divided each H-2B occupation into two skill levels—“entry 
level” (“Level I”) or “experienced level” (“Level II”)—and 
calculated a prevailing wage for each level.4  But in 2005, DOL 
went further in the “2005 Wage Guidance” and divided H-2B 
occupations into four skill and wage levels, “specialty 
occupations,” borrowing from a system that Congress created to 
calculate prevailing wages for the separate H-1B program 
dealing with the admission of skilled workers.  The DOL 
effectuated these changes through guidance letters without 
public notice or seeking comment comparable to the procedure 
followed when rules are adopted in an APA formal rulemaking 
process.  
 Prior to 2005, DOL required the use of wage rates 
established on the basis of government programs such as those 
under the Service Contract Act (“SCA”) or the Davis Bacon Act 
(“DBA”), but in March 2005, DOL changed its approach 
through the 2005 Wage Guidance, which, in the absence of a 
                                                 
3 See Department of Labor, General Administration Letter 
(GAL) 10-84, “Procedures  for Temporary Labor Certifications 
in Non Agricultural Occupations”  (Apr. 23, 1984). 
 
4 See Department of Labor, “Interim Prevailing Wage Policy for 
Nonagricultural Immigration Programs” (May 18, 1995) 
available at http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives. 
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collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), permitted the 
prevailing wage rate to be set using either private employer 
surveys or a Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational 
Employment Statistics (“OES”) survey.  Subsequently, on 
December 19, 2008, DOL adopted the “2008 Wage Rule,” 
which states: “the prevailing wage for labor certification 
purposes shall be the arithmetic mean . . . of the wages of 
workers similarly employed at the skill level in the area of 
intended employment.”  73 Fed. Reg. 78,020, 78,056 (Dec. 18, 
2008) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(b)(2)) (emphasis added).  
By specifying that a given prevailing wage is set “at the skill 
level” for the intended employment, the 2008 Wage Rule directs 
DOL to divide each H-2B occupation into four separate skill 
levels and calculate a prevailing wage for each level.  20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.10(b)(2).  The 2008 Wage Rule requires that, in the 
absence of a CBA, prevailing wage rates are to be determined 
on the basis of either a private employer survey or data derived 
from an OES survey.  DOL did not seek comments on the use of 
the four-level wage methodology for determining  prevailing 
wages when promulgating the 2008 Wage Rule. 
 Even though DOL did not seek public comments on the 
use of this four-level methodology in the H-2B program prior to 
adopting these rules, interested parties submitted comments to it 
contending that use of “skill level” prevailing wages made no 
sense in the context of low-skill H-2B jobs and that their 
adoption resulted in wage depression.  The comments also 
criticized DOL’s decision to permit the use of employer surveys 
when valid OES wage data was available for setting a prevailing 
wage because employer surveys would be used to undercut 
wages that would have been based on OES surveys to the 
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detriment of both American and foreign H-2B workers.  73 Fed. 
Reg. at 78,031; A386-409 (Low Wage Worker Legal Network 
July 2008 comments ETA 2008-0002-0088).  DOL did not 
respond to those comments, instead continuing to set skill-level 
OES wages and evaluate employer surveys submitted pursuant 
to these regulations using the later-adopted 2009 Wage 
Guidance.5  The 2009 Wage Guidance established a 
methodology by which the OES survey data for an occupation 
would be manipulated mathematically to produce four different 
prevailing wages, one for each of four skill levels within an 
occupation. 
 C. Prelude to the Present Litigation 
 Organizations representing H-2B and United States 
workers challenged 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage 
Guidance in CATA I.  These plaintiffs asserted that the vast 
majority of H-2B jobs were low-skilled occupations filled by 
laborers, housekeeping cleaners, and amusement park workers, 
or persons in similar low-skilled employment, and that the rules 
recognized artificial skill distinctions that allowed employers to 
bring foreign workers into the country for employment at wages 
substantially below the average wage for an occupation, to the 
detriment of United States workers. 
                                                 
5 DOL republished the 2005 Wage Guidance in November 2009 
as the 2009 Wage Guidance.  See Employment and Training 
Administration, Prevailing Wage Determination Policy 
Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs (Nov. 2009), 
A135-70.  The 2009 Wage Guidance never was subject to notice 
and comment. 
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 On August 30, 2010, a district court in CATA I held that 
DOL improperly promulgated the “skill level” 2008 Wage Rule. 
 The court reasoned:  
In the absence of any valid regulatory language 
authorizing the use of skill levels in determining 
the prevailing wage rate . . . the four-tier structure 
of skill levels set out in the guidance letters—
which is entirely untethered from any other 
statutory or regulatory provisions, and which 
affirmatively creates the wages paid to H–2B 
workers—constitutes a legislative rule which 
must be subjected to notice and comment.  It has 
not been so subjected and it . . . is therefore 
invalid. 
2010 WL 3431761, at *19.  In invalidating the words “at the 
skill level,” the court stressed that “DOL has never explained its 
reasoning for using skill levels as part of H-2B prevailing wage 
determinations” and that the system never has been subject to 
notice and comment, as the APA requires.  Id. at *19, 25.  
 The district court further found that DOL’s errors in 
promulgating the 2008 Wage Rule were “serious” and of a 
magnitude that counseled in favor of vacating the rule.  Id. at 
*25 (“[W]hile the use of skill levels in 20 C.F.R. § 655.10 is 
invalid for lack of a rational explanation, DOL’s failure to 
provide an explanation for using skill levels in the H–2B 
program constitutes a recurring issue stretching over more than a 
decade, and DOL was, in the context of the 2009 rulemaking, 
presented with comments alleging fundamental problems with 
the use of skill levels in the H–2B program.”).  Nonetheless, in 
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view of the circumstance that the court was invalidating the rule 
due to DOL’s procedural rather than substantive errors, it did 
not vacate the portion of the 2008 Wage Rule providing for 
skill-level methodology; instead, the court remanded the case to 
DOL and ordered it to promulgate a replacement rule within 120 
days, pursuant to the APA’s procedures for notice and comment. 
 Id.  
 Pursuant to that order, DOL issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking. This notice stated that the 2008 Wage Rule’s skill-
level methodology did not comply with DOL’s regulatory and 
statutory mandate because the methodology did not produce 
“the appropriate wage necessary to ensure that U.S. workers are 
not adversely affected by the employment of H-2B workers.”  
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural 
Employment H-2B Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,578-01, 61,579 
(Oct. 5, 2010).  Following notice and comment, DOL announced 
a revised prevailing wage rule in January 2011 (“the 2011 Wage 
Rule”).  Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-
Agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 3452-
0176 (Jan. 19, 2011).  The 2011 Wage Rule prohibits use of 
private surveys except where an otherwise applicable OES 
survey does not provide any data for an occupation in a specific 
geographical location, or where the OES survey does not 
accurately represent the relevant job classification.  Id. at 3467.  
 The 2011 Wage Rule’s preamble explains that the Rule was 
promulgated in response to findings that the 2008 Wage Rule 
“artificially lowers . . . wage[s] to a point that [they] no longer 
represent[ ] market-based wage[s] for the occupation.”  Id. at 
3477.  The preamble concludes: “continuing the current 
calculation methodology . . . does not provide adequate 
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protections to U.S. and H-2B workers,” violating both the INA 
and DHS mandates.  Id. at 3471, 3477.  Though employer 
associations challenged the 2011 Wage Rule, we upheld the rule 
in Louisiana Forestry, 745 F.3d 653.   
 D. Continued Use of Skill-level Definition of              
                     Prevailing Wage Leads to the Present Suit.  
 Notwithstanding the district court’s 2010 order and the 
promulgation of the 2011 Wage Rule, DOL has continued to use 
20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance, as it has 
postponed the 2011 Wage Rule’s effective date on several 
occasions because the 2011 Wage Rule was subject to 
congressional appropriations riders precluding its 
implementation.6  As a result, DOL continued to evaluate labor 
certificates using the 2008 skill-level definition of prevailing 
wage.  Plaintiffs, no doubt frustrated by this course of events, 
returned to the district court, and, on March 21, 2013, that court 
                                                 
6 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2012, Pub. L. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552, Div. B, Title V § 546 
(2011); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-74, 
125 Stat. 786, Div. F, Title I § 110 (2011); Continuing 
Appropriations Resolution, 2013, H.J. Res. 117, 112th Cong., 
126 Stat. 1313 (2012); Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. 113-6, 127 Stat 198, Div. F, 
Title 5 (2013).  But funds for the 2011 Wage Rule finally were 
authorized on January 17, 2014, just prior to our decision 
upholding the rule in Louisiana Forestry, 745 F.3d 653.  See 
Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2014, Pub. L. 113-76, 128 
Stat.51. 
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invalidated the skill-level definition of prevailing wage in 
CATA II, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12.  
 DOL and DHS responded to CATA II by promulgating 
an Interim Final Wage Rule (“IFR”) pursuant to the APA “good 
cause” exception to notice and comment rulemaking.  5 U.S.C. § 
553(b)(B), (d)(3).  The IFR eliminated the use of skill levels 
from the definition of prevailing wage, but continued the 
practice of allowing a prevailing wage to be set by use of either 
an OES or private wage survey.7  78 Fed. Reg. 24,047, 24,061 
(Apr. 24, 2013) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(b)(2) (2013)).  
We note that DOL allowed this unlimited use of private surveys 
despite its 2011 findings that such surveys are unreliable and 
should only be used in extraordinary circumstances.  
 The promulgation of the IFR caused DOL to abandon the 
use of the 2008 Wage Rule and 2009 Wage Guidance to derive 
four skill-level prevailing wages from the OES survey.  Instead 
it set the OES prevailing wage at the mean wage for each 
occupation and area of employment.  78 Fed. Reg. at 24,053, 
24,058-59.  However, the IFR had no effect on DOL’s use of 
private employer surveys in the calculation of prevailing wages 
as DOL continued to evaluate private surveys using the skill-
                                                 
7 The IFR defines the prevailing wage as “the arithmetic mean . . 
. of the wages of workers similarly employed in the area of 
intended employment.  The wage component of the BLS 
Occupational Employment Statistics Survey (OES) shall be used 
to determine the arithmetic mean, unless the employer provides 
a survey acceptable to the 
OFLC under paragraph (f) of this section.”  20 C.F.R. § 
655.10(b)(2) (2013). 
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level definition of prevailing wage. 
 The IFR, however, was hardly DOL’s last word on the H-
2B prevailing wage matter, for on March 14, 2014, the Secretary 
of Labor and DOL notified the regulated community that DOL 
“intends to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking on the 
proper wage methodology for the H-2B program working off of 
the 2011 Wage Rule as a starting point.”  2014 H-2B Notice, 79 
Fed. Reg. at 14,450.  DOL stated that it “will consolidate our 
current review of comments on the 2013 IFR with review of 
comments received on the new notice of proposed rulemaking, 
and will issue a final rule accordingly.”  Id.  Nevertheless, we 
cannot be certain if the new rule will be promulgated, or, if 
promulgated, become effective, because, among other possible 
impediments, its implementation depends on the availability of 
congressional funding and Congress might withhold the funding 
as it has in the past with earlier DOL rules.  Moreover, unless 
and until a new final rule becomes effective, DOL will continue 
to approve skill-level prevailing wages based on private wage 
surveys.  See 78 Fed. Reg. at 24,054 n.13 (indicating intent to 
continue to evaluate private surveys using 2009 Wage 
Guidance). 
 Notwithstanding the March 14, 2014 notification, 
plaintiffs, facing an uncertain picture, on May 8, 2014, sued 
Thomas Perez in his official capacity as Secretary of Labor to 
challenge the lawfulness of the continued use of private wage 
surveys.  Plaintiffs contend that the use of such private wage 
surveys violates the district court’s order in CATA II, 933 F. 
Supp. 2d 700, and that the challenged rules are arbitrary and 
contrary to law and were adopted in excess of DOL’s 
jurisdiction in violation of the APA.  Plaintiffs then sought a 
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preliminary injunction enjoining use of the challenged rules and 
moved for summary judgment.  
 After a hearing on the motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the District Court in CATA III dismissed the case 
without prejudice on July 23, 2014, on the ground that the 
proposed 2014 or 2015 rule-making process could result in a 
prospective change of the rules at issue such that plaintiffs’ 
challenge was not ripe for adjudication.  Plaintiffs filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and sought our expedited consideration of the 
appeal.  We granted that request and now decide the case. 
 
III.  JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this APA case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346, and we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even 
though the dismissal was without prejudice.  See Lichoolas v. 
City of Lowell, 555 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Our review of the District Court’s dismissal on ripeness 
grounds is plenary.  See Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 
983 F.2d 1285, 1289 (3d Cir. 1993).  We also review APA-
based challenges on a de novo basis, “apply[ing] the applicable 
standard of review to the underlying agency decision.”  La. 
Forestry, 745 F.3d at 669 (citing Cyberworld Enter. Techs. Inc. 
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v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2010)).  In 
exercising our jurisdiction, we note that it is “generally 
appropriate” for an appellate court to reach the merits of an issue 
even if the district court has not done so, provided that, as here, 
“the factual record is developed and the issues provide purely 
legal questions upon which an appellate court exercises plenary 
review.”  Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 142 
F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998). 
    
V.  DISCUSSION 
 A.  The District Court Erred in Finding This Case Not 
                       Ripe. 
 The District Court concluded that plaintiffs’ challenge 
was not ripe for adjudication because it believed that DOL 
should be permitted to review and rule on issues involving labor 
certification, at least in the first instance, without intervention 
from the judiciary.  Although we do not doubt that ordinarily 
DOL rather than a court should make administrative 
determinations of the type at issue here, the history of this case 
convinces us that we should intervene at this time because the 
fact that DOL plans to reconsider the appropriateness of the use 
of private wage surveys does not mean that plaintiffs’ challenge 
is unripe.  See Am. Paper Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 355 n.8 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding case ripe even though EPA was 
considering rulemaking which could moot case); Am. Petroleum 
Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting 
EPA argument that planned rulemaking rendered case unripe 
and noting “an agency always retains the power to revise a final 
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rule through additional rulemaking.  If the possibility that 
amendments to a rule was sufficient to render an otherwise fit 
challenge unripe, review could be deferred indefinitely.”). 
 As we have explained, courts require a case to be ripe to 
be adjudicated to avoid becoming entangled in premature 
adjudication.  Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148, 87 S.Ct. at 1515.  
With regard to administrative agency actions, considerations of 
ripeness reflect the need “to protect . . . agencies from judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized 
and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” 
 Id. at 148-49, 87 S.Ct. at 1515.  When deciding if a case is ripe 
for adjudication, a court must consider (1) the fitness of the 
issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties 
from withholding judicial consideration.  Id.  When making a 
“fitness for review” determination, a court considers whether the 
issues presented are purely legal, and the degree to which the 
challenged action is final.  A court must consider whether the 
claims involve uncertain and contingent events that may not 
occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.  See Phil. Fed'n of 
Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 323 (3d Cir. 1998).  We have 
taken these considerations into account and now determine that 
it is appropriate to subject the issues presented here to judicial 
review at this time, and that further delay may cause plaintiffs to 
suffer unjustifiable hardship.  Moreover, we are satisfied that 
plaintiffs are entitled to relief.  Thus, we will reverse the order 
of July 23, 2014, grant relief, and remand the matter to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
  1.  This Case Is Fit for Judicial Resolution. 
 We are satisfied that DOL’s wage determinations 
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predicated on private wage surveys are final agency actions.  We 
come to this conclusion even though the District Court found 
that “DOL [has] not yet taken a final position – specifically 
here, as to whether prevailing wage determinations under 20 
C.F.R. § 655.10(f) using the 2009 Wage Guidance are valid, 
enforceable, and the specific wage methodology to be used.”  
CATA III, 2014 WL 4100708, at *8.  Notwithstanding the 
District Court’s view, it is uncontested that both 20 C.F.R. § 
655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance have been in place for 
years, and DOL has been using them regularly when acting on 
labor certification applications.   
 DOL’s use of the challenged rules distinguishes this 
proceeding from cases the District Court cited in its opinion as 
in those cases the agencies involved had not implemented the 
challenged rule.  See Felmeister v. Office of Att’y Ethics, 856 
F.2d 529, 535-37 (3d Cir. 1988) (challenge to attorney 
advertising rule not ripe where ethics committee had yet to 
interpret the rule and plaintiff had never submitted 
advertisement for approval); Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 666-
68 (3d Cir. 1980) (challenge to subpoena not ripe where agency 
had not made a decision to enforce the subpoena); AT&T Corp. 
v. FCC, 369 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (challenge not ripe 
because the FCC reserved judgment on whether safeguards were 
necessary and its policy remained undetermined).  This case is 
different because DOL’s ongoing use of 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f)) 
and 2009 Wage Guidance to approve private wage surveys 
demonstrates that DOL has taken a “final” position for the 
purposes of our ripeness determination.  This finality is not 
undermined even though the present rules may not remain 
DOL’s last position with regard to H-2B program rules.  See 
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Philadelphia Fed’n, 150 F.3d at 323. 
 The use and effect of DOL’s rules allowing private 
surveys in prevailing wage determinations make this case 
analogous to Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 
401 (D.C. Cir. 2013), a case in which the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a ripeness argument 
seeking dismissal of a challenge to a temporary regulation the 
EPA had committed to replace by a date certain.  The court 
found the case ripe because the issues were “purely legal” and 
“sufficiently final” and the challenged regulation was causing 
injury to the plaintiff.  Id. at 408.  Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 
2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998), is similarly instructive.  In Cobell, the 
Department of the Interior argued that a challenge to individual 
Indian trust account (IIM) procedures was not ripe because the 
challenged procedures were interlocutory.  Id. at 34. The court 
rejected that argument, stating: 
Although the defendants surely can, and by their 
own admission should, reform the IIM trust 
accounting system, the deficiencies of their 
present system do not defeat its review on the 
grounds of finality.  The system chosen by the 
defendants is being used in the administration of 
the plaintiffs’ accounts.  The fact that the 
defendants have the power to change the system 
cannot render the present system they have 
chosen to be one interlocutory in nature.  
Id. (emphasis added).  The Cobell court emphasized that the 
Department was making ongoing use of the IIM system and that 
the plaintiffs had no choice but to have their accounts 
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administered under that system.  The accounting system was 
thus “final” for the purposes of a ripeness determination, 
although it was interlocutory in the sense that it was subject to 
further evaluation.  See also Am. Paper, 996 F.2d at 355 n.8. 
 The District Court also relied on National Treasury 
Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1431 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996), for the proposition that the Court would conserve 
judicial resources by delaying adjudication of the dispute until 
DOL had completed its review and rule-making procedures.  
National Treasury, however, is unpersuasive with respect to the 
matter before us.  That case involved a challenge to the Line 
Item Veto Act, which, although signed into law, would not go 
into effect until the President submitted a balanced budget.  Id.  
Because it was unclear whether this triggering event ever would 
occur and, if so, when, and application of the Act could not 
harm the plaintiffs until such time, the court concluded that it 
would be a waste of judicial resources for it to entertain the 
challenge.  Id. at 1430.  Here, in contrast to the situation in 
National Treasury, plaintiffs’ harm is not contingent on some 
triggering event; DOL is using the challenged rules on an 
ongoing basis in the administration of the H-2B program.  
Accordingly, this case is presently fit for adjudication. 
 2.  Withholding Judicial Consideration                    
                      Considerably Harms Plaintiffs. 
 The second prong of our ripeness analysis requires that 
we evaluate the hardship that may be imposed on the parties if 
the courts deny judicial review at this time, and determine 
whether the challenged action has a “direct and immediate” 
impact on the parties.  See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152, 87 
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S.Ct. at 1517. 
 The DOL’s evaluation of employer surveys using the 
skill-level provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 
Wage Guidance is adversely affecting United States workers by 
forcing them to accept depressed wages or face being replaced 
by foreign H-2B workers.  Indeed, the District Court recognized 
that the workers were suffering this injury and noted that 
“Plaintiffs . . . will have every opportunity to participate in the 
new rulemaking planned for 2014-2015.”  CATA III, 2014 WL 
4100708, at *10.  But the possibility that plaintiffs will be able 
to participate in some future rulemaking that may or may not 
lead to a change in the rules does not ameliorate the harm that 
DOL’s current use of those rules is causing plaintiffs now. 
 DOL is not delaying or conditionally issuing its labor 
certifications during its internal deliberations; rather, it is using 
the directives of 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage 
Guidance to issue certifications.  Thus, we are facing a different 
landscape than would have been the case if DOL suspended 
issuing certifications based on private surveys or only issued 
certifications conditioned on the employer’s promise to make 
retroactive adjustments to the wages of the foreign workers 
taking into account the results of DOL’s future rulemaking.  See 
CATA I, 2010 WL 4823236, at *3 (DOL has authority to issue 
conditional certifications).  Instead, it argues that 20 C.F.R. § 
655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance lack finality even 
though it is continuing to use them when issuing final labor 
certifications. 
 It seems clear that each time DOL uses the challenged 
rules to certify to DHS that an application using a private survey 
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wage “will not adversely affect U.S. workers” pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iv)(A), DOL is making a final economic 
determination as to both the validity of the survey and the 
economic effect of the survey wage.8  And despite some hedging 
by appellees during oral argument before us, it is evident that 
DOL’s continuing issuance of labor certifications based on the 
                                                 
8 DOL asks this Court to affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
based on what DOL itself characterizes as an extension of the 
ripeness doctrine.  The only case DOL cites in support of its 
“extension” argument is American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 
683 F.3d 382 (D.C. Cir. 2012), a case in which a trade 
association of petroleum refineries petitioned for review of a 
2008 EPA rule deregulating hazardous secondary material but 
not addressing “spent refinery catalysts.”  The challenged rule 
stated that the decision not to deregulate spent refinery catalysts 
was “tentative” and that EPA would “address the catalysts in a 
separate proposed rulemaking.”  Id. at 386.  While the case was 
on appeal, the EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
which indicated that it intended to treat spent refinery catalysts 
the same as other hazardous secondary material.  Id. at 388. The 
court found that the tentative 2008 rule was causing the 
plaintiffs little harm and held the appeal in abeyance pending the 
completion of the new rulemaking.  Id. at 389-90.  We find the 
matter before us to be quite different.  Here, there is nothing 
“tentative” about the challenged rules; DOL has been using 
them since 2005 in making final determinations.  Moreover, the 
ongoing, direct harm to the livelihood of United States workers 
attributable to use of the challenged regulations clearly 
distinguishes this case from American Petroleum. 
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skill-level provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 
Wage Guidance is affecting United States workers’ wages.  
Rather than pay non-skill-level OES wages required by the IFR 
and face an average 21% wage increase, more and more 
employers seek to exploit the lingering loophole in DOL’s 
administration of the H-2B program.  See 78 Fed. Reg. at 
24,053, 24,058-59.   
 In the 12 months prior to the District Court’s March 21, 
2013 order and subsequent issuance of the IFR, applicants 
submitted only 49 surveys employing a private wage survey 
determination.9  However, with the vacatur of the skill-level 
definition and DOL’s use of the mean OES survey wage as the 
prevailing wage, employers have turned to employer surveys as 
a way to continue paying depressed skill-level wages: 1,559 
employer surveys were approved in the nine-month period 
                                                 
9 DOL publicly posts database summaries of prevailing wage 
determinations on its website at 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm.  
In the year prior to the issuance of the IFR (April 2012 to March 
2013) seafood industry related jobs in SOC Codes 51‐ 3022 
(Meat, Poultry, and Fish Cutters and Trimmers), 53‐7064 
(Packers and Packagers, Hand), and 45‐3011 (Fishers and 
Related Fishing Workers) constituted the only employer wage 
surveys accepted by DOL apart from those submitted in five 
cases for Ski/Snowboard Instructors under SOC Code 25‐3021 
(Self‐Enrichment Education Teachers).  Each of the seafood 
industry occupational codes are classified by DOL as 
occupations requiring little prior training or experience. 
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between July 1, 2013, and March 31, 2014 – an increase from 
the prior period of more than 31 times (3,182%); 21.1% of those 
prevailing wage determinations were certified at wages below 
the OES Skill Level I wage (that is, at a wage less than the 
average paid by the lowest paying third of employers in the OES 
survey), and 94.4% offered wages below the OES Skill Level II 
wage.10  
 DOL has found that these wage levels are causing wage 
depression among domestic workers.  76 Fed. Reg. at 3463.  
Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the detriment to workers 
such as those represented by plaintiffs is the significant 
expansion of the usage of employer wage surveys in the 
landscaping industry, which did not submit any employer wage 
surveys in the year prior to April 2013 despite being the industry 
employing the most H-2B employees.11  In the nine-month 
                                                 
10 That DOL will continue to approve skill level prevailing 
wages at these Skill Levels is apparent from the DOL quarterly 
update to its Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) 
Performance Data issued in mid-April.  See: 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm; 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/docs/py2014q2/PWD_F
Y14_Q2.xlsx.  
 
11 See DOL Office of Foreign Labor Certification, H-2B 
Temporary Non-Agricultural Labor Certification Program - 
Selected Statistics, FY 2013, reflecting that those landscaping 
positions constituted 38% of the H-2B positions certified in 
FY2013. Available at: 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/H2B_Selected_Stati
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period from July 2013 to March 2014, 1,240 prevailing wage 
determinations for landscape workers (SOC Code 37-3011) 
were based on employer surveys, accounting for 42.7% of all 
the prevailing wage determinations made for that occupation 
during that period.  DOL approved 97.7% of those surveys at 
wage rates below the OES Skill Level II wage rate.12 
 We are convinced that we should not permit DOL to 
continue to discharge its investigatory and rule-making 
functions as it is doing now because its continued approval of 
skill-level wages submitted based on employer wage surveys is 
not only adversely affecting the wages of similarly employed 
United States workers, but the H-2B program as now 
administered is leading to unjustified disparities between 
employers who submit private wage surveys and otherwise 
similarly situated employers who do not submit surveys and 
who therefore must pay the OES prevailing wage.  An agency’s 
promise regarding prospective rulemaking has no effect on the 
ripeness of a challenge, like the one plaintiffs make here, when 
the challenged rules are being used as the basis of final agency 
actions.  DOL’s proposed rulemaking, in the context of its 
ongoing practices and the harm suffered by plaintiffs, does not 
                                                                                                             
stics_FY_2013_YTD_Q4_final.pdf. 
 
12 Of the 1,240 prevailing wage determinations issued for SOC 
Code 37-3011 based on employer provided wage surveys in the 
July 2013 to March 2014 time period, 1,212 cases resulted in 
prevailing wage determinations below the depressed Skill Level 
II wage rate and 174 of these cases (14%) involved 
determinations at wage rates below the Skill Level I wage rate. 
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somehow render what otherwise would be a case ripe for 
litigation unripe.  Accordingly, we conclude that this matter is 
ripe for adjudication, and we will review the validity of 20 
C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance. 
 B. Section 655.10(f) Violates the Administrative        
                      Procedure Act. 
 We have considered but rejected remanding this case to 
the District Court so that it could decide the case on the merits.  
Rather, in the interest of judicial economy and because we 
recognize that workers in this country are being prejudiced by 
the current administration of the H-2B program, we will reach 
the merits of this controversy.  In deciding to do so, we reiterate 
that it is “generally appropriate” for a court of appeals to reach 
the merits of an issue that a district court did not decide 
provided, as is true here, “the factual record is developed and the 
issues provide purely legal questions upon which an appellate 
court exercises plenary review.”  Hudson United, 142 F.3d at 
159.  “In such a case, an appellate tribunal can act just as a trial 
court would, so nothing is lost by having the reviewing court 
address the disputed issue in the first instance.”  Id.; see also 
N.J. Carpenters v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 760 F.3d 297, 305 
(3d Cir. 2014) (deciding an issue under the Labor Management 
Relations Act that the district court did not reach). 
 We find support for our decision to reach the merits of 
the controversy in a recent court of appeals opinion dealing with 
a challenge under the APA to DOL’s H-2A temporary labor 
certification rules.  Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 
2014).  There the court of appeals, after finding that the district 
court improperly had dismissed the case for lack of standing and 
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thus lack of jurisdiction, concluded that “[a] remand to the 
district court would be a waste of judicial resources” in light of 
the fact that “the district court has no comparative advantage in 
reviewing the agency action for compliance with notice and 
comment requirements.  An appeal from any district court 
decision after remand is likely, and our review of the district 
court’s decision would be de novo.”  Id. at 1020.  The long 
litigation history of this matter shows that these considerations 
apply with equal force here. 
  1.  Section 655.10(f) Violates 5 U.S.C. §         
                                  706(2)(D). 
 In considering this case on the merits, we determine first 
that Section 655.10(f) is procedurally invalid because DOL has 
not explained why it has been allowing employers to use private 
wage surveys in prevailing wage determinations when valid 
OES wage rates are available for the same purpose.  An agency 
must show on the record that it has satisfied its obligation to 
supply a reasoned analysis when it departs from past policy.  5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).  Without such analysis, a reviewing court 
may conclude that an agency has taken action without 
complying with procedures required by law.  Id.  When making 
a shift in policy, an agency “must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866 (1983) (quoting 
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 
S.Ct. 239, 242 (1962)).  A reviewing court then “must consider 
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
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judgment.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 A court will set aside an agency’s action as “arbitrary and 
capricious” if the agency does not provide a “reasoned 
explanation” for its change in course.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497, 534-35, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007); Nat’l Cable 
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
981, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2699-700 (2005) (“unexplained 
inconsistency” in agency practice is a reason for holding a 
policy reversal “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA, unless 
“the agency adequately explains the reasons for a reversal of 
policy”); see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43, 103 S. Ct. at 2866-
67; see also CBS Corp. v. FCC., 663 F.3d 122, 145 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 The history of this matter shows that prior to 2005, DOL 
would not consider employer wage surveys in prevailing wage 
determinations when an applicable governmental wage survey 
such as those of the DBA, SCA, or OES was available for that 
purpose.  DOL changed that policy with the 2005 Wage 
Guidance, which authorized unlimited use of private surveys.   
At that time, DOL did not offer any explanation for that change 
in policy and it did not explain its policy change three years later 
when it codified the 2005 Wage Guidance as the 2008 Wage 
Rule, 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(b)(2) and (f) (2008).  DOL’s failure to 
offer an explanation in 2008 is unfortunate in light of public 
comments on the 2008 rule questioning the use of employer 
surveys where valid OES wage rates were available, especially 
inasmuch as some of the comments presciently warned that 
allowing private surveys in prevailing wage determinations 
would invite employers to undermine the OES wage rate.  73 
Fed. Reg. at 78,031.  Both in 2005 and in 2008, DOL should 
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have provided a “rational connection between the facts found 
and the choice made” with regards to these wage 
determinations.  La. Forestry, 745 F.3d at 679 (citing State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2866).   
 Finally, in 2011, DOL proposed adoption of a policy 
limiting the use of private employer surveys to situations in 
which a valid government survey was not available for the same 
purpose.  76 Fed. Reg. at 3459, 3465-66.  In doing so, DOL 
publicly acknowledged that DBA, SCA, and OES surveys were 
the most reliable bases for setting prevailing wages and that 
“employer surveys are not, generally, consistently reliable.”  Id. 
at 3465.  DOL also noted that “[e]mployers typically provide 
private surveys when the result is to lower wages below the 
prevailing rate . . . a result that is contrary to the Department’s 
role in ensuring no adverse effect.”  Id.  Yet when appropriation 
bill riders precluded the 2011 Rule from going into effect, DOL 
reversed its course again and issued its IFR in April 2013, 
allowing unlimited use of private surveys.  The return to its 
post-2005 policy seems unjustifiable in light of DOL’s findings 
in the 2011 rulemaking, but, as in 2005 and 2008, DOL offered 
no explanation for the change in its policy.  DOL simply stated: 
This interim final rule will permit the use of 
employer-provided surveys in lieu of wages 
derived from the other sources, in order for DOL 
to provide the advice DHS has determined is 
necessary for it to adjudicate H-2B petitions. 
78 Fed. Reg. at 24,054.  This “explanation” is hardly sufficient 
for it merely explains what has been done, not why it was 
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done.13   
 We accordingly conclude that DOL has violated the APA 
by its repeated failures to provide explanations for its policy 
shifts.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D); La. Forestry, 745 F.3d at 679. 
 Though we are aware that DOL faced considerable difficulty 
implementing the 2011 rule because of congressional 
appropriations riders precluding the spending of funds for that 
purpose, we nevertheless find DOL’s scant explanations 
insufficient to comply with APA requirements.14  
                                                 
13 DOL attempts to support its argument on this point by citing 
Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 2009), but 
that case does not support its position.  Gardner holds that when 
an “agency has articulated and acted on a consistent rationale 
throughout the course of a lengthy informal rulemaking process, 
the final rule is not arbitrary and capricious merely because the 
rationale was not fully reiterated in the final agency action.”  Id. 
at 793 (citations omitted).  As the history of the administration 
of the H-2B program shows, DOL’s actions are the antithesis of 
consistent.  Its policy positions regarding private surveys have 
oscillated without explanation from 2005 to 2011 to 2013 and 
DOL has failed at every opportunity to “fully reiterate” its 
rationale for policy shifts. 
 
14 It is significant that no party challenges Congress’s undoubted 
power to frustrate executive action by withholding 
appropriations necessary to implement that action.  We also note 
that DOL has indicated that its decision to abandon the policies 
and factual findings in the 2011 rulemaking is explained in later-
released Federal Register notices.  However, the notices that 
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  2.  Section 655.10(f) Violates 5 U.S.C. §          
                                 706(2)(A) as Arbitrary. 
 We next conclude that in addition to being procedurally 
flawed, Section 655.10(f) is substantively arbitrary, and, thus by 
adopting it, DOL violated 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  Under the 
APA, a reviewing court may set aside agency action if it is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  An agency acts 
arbitrarily and capriciously if it “has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.”  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2867. 
 Given DOL’s endorsement of the OES wages as “among 
                                                                                                             
DOL references merely inform the public that the 2011 Wage 
Rule is not in effect due to an appropriations rider.  They do not 
draw a connection between the appropriations rider and some 
intentional attack on the private wage survey provisions in the 
2011 Wage Rule – nor could they, as Congress itself offered no 
explanation for the adoption of the rider.  See Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-55, 
125 Stat. 552, Div. B, Title V § 546 (2011); Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, Div. F, 
Title I § 110 (2011); Continuing Appropriations Resolution 
2013, H.J. Res. 117, 112 Cong., 126 Stat. 1313 (2012); 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, 
Pub. L. 113-6, 127 Stat 198, Div. F, Title 5 (2013). 
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the largest, most comprehensive, and continuous statistical 
survey programs of the Federal Government,” 78 Fed. Reg. at 
24,053; 76 Fed. Reg. at 3463; 69 Fed. Reg. 77,326, 77,369 (Dec. 
27, 2004), and its finding that the OES survey “is the most 
consistent, efficient, and accurate means of determining the 
prevailing wage rate for the H-2B program,” 76 Fed. Reg. at 
3465; see also id. (DOL stating that “employers typically 
provide private surveys when the result is to lower wages below 
the prevailing wage rate”), we are satisfied that DOL acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when it permitted—and by its 
policies, structurally encouraged—employers to rely on details 
of a private survey when there was a valid OES wage survey 
available for use in determining the prevailing wage for the 
implicated employment.  After all, DOL publicly has pointed 
out that employer surveys are generally unrealistic.  See 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 3465 (DOL stating that “employers typically provide 
private surveys when the result is to lower wages below the 
prevailing wage rate”).  Nonetheless, DOL has perpetuated a 
system by which employers are benefitted financially by 
submitting private surveys to justify wages lower than the OES 
wages, a practice that the interested parties in this case have well 
understood.  As the District Court noted, “both sides 
acknowledge that employers pay for expensive private surveys 
aiming to obtain a wage rate that is lower than the available 
OES survey wage rate.”  CATA III, 2014 WL 4100708, at *5.  
 As a further illustration of the arbitrary nature of Section 
655.10(f), we emphasize that this authorization creates a system 
that permits employers who can afford private surveys to bring 
H-2B workers into the country for employment at lower wages 
than employers who cannot afford such surveys and who 
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therefore must offer the higher OES prevailing wage.  DOL’s 
statistics for the Philadelphia metropolitan area demonstrate that 
this disparity can be considerable.  From July 2013 to April 
2014, DOL approved 115 prevailing wage applications for 
landscape workers in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.  These 
approved applications included 32 based on the OES survey, 
which required a minimum payment of $14.04 per hour, and 83 
based on employer surveys, which were approved at wage rates 
ranging from $9.16 to $11.22 per hour—a difference amounting 
to as much as $200 for a 40-hour workweek.  This kind of 
disparity that harms workers whether foreign or domestic, is 
readily avoidable, and completely unjustified.  After years of 
litigation, DOL cannot offer any rational justification for this 
policy as it leads to similarly situated workers in the same 
market in the same season bringing home widely disparate 
paychecks.  See Nazareth Hosp. v. Sec’y of HHS, 747 F.3d 172, 
179 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if 
the agency offers insufficient reasons for treating similar 
situations differently.”). 
 Failure to consider relevant factors or provide an 
adequate explanation for an agency action are indeed among the 
“wide range of reasons why agency action may be judicially 
branded as ‘arbitrary and capricious.’”  FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 
1081, 1088 (D. C. Cir. 1986).  DOL has not attempted to 
demonstrate that it has considered the relevant factors brought to 
its attention by interested parties during the course of the 
rulemaking, or that it had made a “reasoned choice among the 
various alternatives presented.”  Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. 
Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 700 (3d Cir. 1979).  We conclude that 
20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) is arbitrary and capricious and was 
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adopted in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  
 C. The 2009 Wage Guidance Violates the                   
                      Administrative Procedure Act. 
 DOL has acted contrary to law because, when evaluating 
wage surveys based on skill levels pursuant to the 2009 Wage 
Guidance, DOL directly contradicts the current prevailing wage 
definition in 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(b)(2) (2013), adopted in 
response to CATA I, which rejects skill-level considerations.  
Agency rules that are inconsistent with or in violation of an 
agency’s own regulations are unlawful.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & 
(C); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 
S.Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994).   DOL admits as much as it “agrees 
that employer-provided surveys likely should not be based on 
the collection of wages at skill levels.”  See 76 Fed. Reg. at 
3466-67.  Despite this candid acknowledgement, DOL requests 
that we allow the 2009 Wage Guidance to remain enforceable 
until DOL completes its proposed rulemaking.  But we see no 
reason to allow DOL to continue to use a wage guidance that 
contradicts its own rules.   
 It is particularly troublesome that use of the 2009 Wage 
Guidance violates 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (C) in that the 
undercutting of the OES wage rate is impairing DOL’s carrying 
out of Congress’s statutory charge.  Congress has charged DOL 
with the duty to ensure that it grants certifications only if they 
do not adversely affect wages and working conditions of United 
States workers, and it is the burden of DOL to be mindful of and 
honor that charge.  However, employers increasingly have been 
submitting private surveys authorized by Section 655.10(f) in 
order to obtain a wage rate that is lower than the OES wage rate 
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indicates would be appropriate—the wage rate DOL itself has 
determined is necessary to avoid an adverse effect on foreign 
and domestic employee’s wages.  The 2009 Wage Guidance 
therefore establishes criteria contrary to both the letter and spirit 
of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (C), and DOL’s use of it in the 
consideration of labor certification applications is unlawful. 
 D.  Vacatur is the Appropriate Remedy. 
 Finally we come to the remedy.  Section 706(2) of the 
APA provides that a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action” that violates the APA.  5 U.S.C. § 
706(2).  Ordinarily, reviewing courts have applied that provision 
by vacating invalid agency action and remanding the matter to 
the agency for further review.  See, e.g., Abington Mem. Hosp. 
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1984).  Here it is 
particularly appropriate to remand the case with a vacatur 
because if we did not do so, we would leave in place a rule that 
is causing the very adverse effect that DOL is charged with 
preventing, and we would be “legally sanction[ing] an agency's 
disregard of its statutory or regulatory mandate.”  CATA II, 933 
F. Supp. 2d at 714.  DOL’s explanations during oral argument 
made clear that it has no expectation of expeditious 
administrative review or rehabilitation of either the 2009 Wage 
Guidance or its broad employer survey rule, 20 C.F.R. § 
655.10(f), despite DOL’s recorded admission that Section 
655.10(f)’s broad authorization of employer surveys “is contrary 
to the Department’s role in ensuring no adverse impact.”  76 
Fed. Reg. at 3465.  
 We therefore act now to grant plaintiffs’ vacatur request 
of 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance.  We hold 
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both provisions to be arbitrary and capricious and in violation of 
the APA.  We direct that private surveys no longer be used in 
determining the mean rate of wage for occupations except where 
an otherwise applicable OES survey does not provide any data 
for an occupation in a specific geographical location, or where 
the OES survey does not accurately represent the relevant job 
classification.  We note that  DOL’s existing regulations provide 
ample alternatives for setting prevailing wages including use of 
OES surveys.  Moreover, DOL has the option of immediately 
issuing the employer survey portions of the 2011 rulemaking as 
an interim rule pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(B) and (d)(3).  
That rule offers rational, lawful limits on the use of employer 
surveys, already has gone through notice and comment, has been 
funded by Congress in its 2014 authorization, and has been 
upheld by this Court in Louisiana Forestry, 745 F.3d 653.15 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
15 On January 17, 2014, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2014, Public Law 113–76, 128 Stat. 5, was enacted.  Unlike past 
appropriations, that Act did not include a rider banning 
appropriations to implement, administer, and enforce the 2011 
Wage Rule:  For the first time in over two years, DOL's 
appropriations did not prohibit the implementation or 
enforcement of the 2011 Wage Rule.  Wage Methodology for 
the Temporary Non–Agricultural Employment H–2B Program, 
79 Fed. Reg. at 14,453; see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 3452. The 
parties agree that the 2011 Wage Rule now is funded fully. 
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 For the aforesaid reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order dismissing this case on the ground that it is not 
ripe for review and hold that 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 
Wage Guidance are arbitrary and capricious and adopted in 
violation of the APA.  We grant plaintiffs’ vacatur request of 20 
C.F.R. § 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance as we hold 
both regulations to be arbitrary and capricious and in violation 
of the APA.  We will remand this case to the District Court for 
any further proceedings that may be necessary.  
 
